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Preserving the Global Nuclear Order: The Trident Agreements and 
the Arms Control Debate, 1977-82 
 
The Trident negotiations were a pivotal moment in establishing the US-UK nuclear 
relationship as an accepted element of the global nuclear order. The Trident agreements 
marked the first supply of a US delivery system to the UK since the signing of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the development of Superpower arms control. In turn, the 
development of these agendas in the international sphere influenced Anglo-American 
discussions on the replacement to Polaris. The Carter White House procrastinated on the 
provision of Trident due in part to their concerns over the political ramifications for their 
wider non-proliferation and arms control goals. However, fortuitously for the UK’s nuclear 
programme, US-UK discussions on the replacement to Polaris coalesced with the 
reorientation of US foreign policy towards containment of the Soviet Union under Jimmy 
Carter and then Ronald Reagan – enabling the finalisation of the sale of Trident to the UK. 
As such, the status of the US-UK nuclear relationship as a broadly accepted element of the 
global nuclear order is a legacy of the ‘long 1970s’ alongside the early Cold War.  
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The United Kingdom is technically dependent on the United States for the maintenance of 
its advanced nuclear capability. Indeed, US assistance has been crucial to the continuation 
of the UK’s nuclear system since 1960 when the Macmillan government cancelled the 
country’s last indigenous missile, Blue Streak, following President Dwight Eisenhower’s 
offer to supply the UK with the Skybolt missile. 1  Thenceforth Britain entered a ‘new 
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paradoxical phase’ in its nuclear policy; British technical dependence upon the US would 
preserve Britain’s ‘independent deterrent’. 2  When the US cancelled the Skybolt  
programme in 1962, the Kennedy administration agreed to supply the Polaris Submarine-
Launched Ballistic Missile System.3 Then in July 1980, the United Kingdom and the United 
States signed the Trident C4 agreement, which agreed on the sale of US Trident C4 missiles 
to the UK. Following President Ronald Reagan’s decision to replace the Trident C4 missile 
with the Trident D5 system in March 1982, the UK and US governments signed the Trident 
D5 agreement.  
Some historians have stressed the history of US-UK nuclear relations, in particular 
the precedent of two earlier inter-governmental agreements between the US and UK, the 
1958 Mutual Defence Agreement and P0laris Sales Agreement, as a means to understanding 
the Trident agreements.4 Whilst this perspective has merit, it can also lead to tendentious 
analysis that underplays the role of agency and contingency; few things in history, if any, 
are inevitable. As is widely agreed amongst historians in the field, at the core of the US-UK 
nuclear relationship rests mutual interests. 5  The closeness, or otherwise, of Anglo-
American nuclear cooperation at any given point of time rests principally on the alignment 
of each nation’s interests. Due to a broad commonality in strategic concerns, particularly 
during the Cold War, there was a good deal of continuity in the US-UK nuclear relationship. 
However, at the same time, there were also moments of acute tension and dispute. 6 
Subsequently, historians like John Baylis and Andrew Priest have highlighted the frequent 
renegotiation of the relationship, in accordance with the dynamics of mutual interests.7   
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 Compared to Anglo-American nuclear cooperation in the early Cold War, the 
relationship in the ‘long 1970s’ has received relatively little scholarly attention.8 Given the 
importance of mutual interests to US-UK nuclear cooperation, detailed study of this era is 
important for understanding the maintenance of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship 
into the present era. The Trident agreements, in particular, advanced that relationship. The 
Trident negotiations occurred at a time of strategic reorientation by the United States. The 
United Kingdom’s efforts to replace its Polaris system coincided with an evolution of US-
Soviet thinking in arms control that was transformative for the Cold War nuclear order. 
The late 1970s saw the end of détente, followed by the rekindling of the Cold War with a 
renewed stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union. The impact of these 
wider US strategic concerns on the Trident negotiations has yet to be the focus of detailed 
archival study. 9  As such to deepen understanding of the maintenance of the Anglo-
American nuclear relationship in the ‘long 1970s’, this article explores the interrelationship 
between US-UK nuclear cooperation and US policy on arms control throughout the Trident 
negotiations.  
This analysis reveals how the evolution of US thinking on détente and arms control 
influenced the UK’s efforts to replace Trident and caused concern for the British 
government over the future of their nuclear programme. Washington was willing to assist 
with the replacement of Polaris if it did not interfere with wider US foreign policy goals. 
For the Carter White House, as they tried to move beyond an American foreign policy 
centred on containment, the maintenance of the UK’s deterrent was not a priority. At the 
Guadeloupe summit in January 1979, Jimmy Carter told the British Prime Minister, James 
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Callaghan, that he would consider the supply of Trident C4 to the UK. However, 
notwithstanding Carter’s forthcoming response, throughout 1979 and early 1980 the British 
government remained uncertain that the Trident C4 agreement would come to fruition. 
This was because of the Carter administration’s concerns over the ramifications of the sale 
for progress on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), NATO consensus on the dual-
track policy, and Carter’s re-election.  
Throughout this period, the Carter White House struggled to resolve the political 
dilemmas that certain contradictions between their commitment to nuclear arms control, 
NATO cohesion and US-UK nuclear cooperation raised. Their solution was to delay selling 
Trident. Fortuitously for the British government in 1980, due to the White House’s 
hardened approach to the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan and the end 
of détente, these dilemmas over the supply of Trident abated, and the deal was finalised in 
July 1980. In contrast, the Reagan administration’s policy on arms control in their first years 
in office meant that their agreement to supply the D5 came swiftly. For the nascent Reagan 
White House, the supply of Trident raised no dilemmas for its wider foreign policy goals as 
they aimed to counter the Soviet Union through increasing the nuclear and conventional 
strength of the West.  
In turn, the Trident negotiations shaped the contemporary nuclear order. The 
Trident agreements were the first supply of a US delivery system to the UK since the signing 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and the development of Superpower arms 
control. The agreements thereby reinforced the US-UK nuclear relationship as an 
acceptable element of the global nuclear order. As this article demonstrates, the US supply 
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of a delivery system was contingent upon a number of concurrent global issues such as 
arms control. The eventual outcome was due in part to the evolution of the wider 
international environment. As such, the continuation of the US-UK nuclear relationship 
into the post-Cold War era is a legacy of developments in the ‘long 1970s’, alongside US-
UK nuclear cooperation in the Second World War and the early Cold War.  
 
In December 1977, a British Cabinet committee met to discuss the replacement of the 
Polaris nuclear system. A decision needed to be made in the coming years as, while Polaris 
would remain operative until about 1993, a successor system could take up to fifteen years 
to develop.10 The Cabinet Committee quickly concluded that they should ‘probably… rule 
out the idea of a wholly British ballistic missile on grounds both of capability and cost’.11 
This left Britain with, primarily, three remaining options, which were all, to an extent, 
reliant upon US cooperation: the purchase of US Trident C4 missiles; the replacement of 
Polaris with cruise missiles; or Anglo-French cooperation, which, under the terms of the 
1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, would likely require US agreement due to extensive 
American assistance with the UK’s weapon and propulsion technology.12  
In 1977, the UK government feared that White House commitment to arms control 
could complicate their efforts to replace Polaris; a problem that the UK Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan had not faced when he secured President John F. Kennedy’s agreement 
to sell the Polaris system in 1962.13 On entering the White House in January 1977, Jimmy 
Carter had a bold vision for the global nuclear order. He had campaigned on a platform of 
using arms control talks to achieve deep cuts in US and Soviet nuclear capability and 
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pledged to achieve ‘a new and genuine détente’.14 The Soviets outright rejection of the 
‘deep cuts’ proposal in March 1977 tempered Carter’s ambitions.15 Nevertheless, the Carter 
administration remained committed to the SALT process. Consequently, John Hunt, UK 
Cabinet Secretary, informed Callaghan in 1977 that he foresaw that US arms control 
negotiations ‘could have implications for each’ of the Polaris successor options, and ‘could 
be especially significant for United States cooperation’.16  
 In February 1978, the UK government commissioned Anthony Duff, Deputy Under-
Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, and Ronald Mason, Chief Scientific Adviser at the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), to produce a study that would consider the ‘principal options’ 
for the replacement of Polaris.17 In December 1978, the resultant Duff-Mason report was 
ready for ministerial consideration. The report favoured the Trident C4 system with MIRV 
as the successor to Polaris. A multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) 
payload for a ballistic missile contains several warheads with each one able to strike 
separate pre-determined targets. Such a system would enhance Britain’s first-strike 
proficiency, provide greater damage per missile payload, and reduce the effectiveness of 
anti-ballistic missile systems. For these reasons, the authors of the Duff-Mason report felt 
that a MIRV system, such as the Trident C4, better fulfilled the ‘Moscow criterion’; a 
guiding principle in UK nuclear strategy that Britain’s nuclear ‘deterrent’ should be able to 
defeat ballistic missile defences around Moscow.18 Moreover, in light of the lessons of 
Chevaline and the huge additional expenditure of an independent system, Duff and Mason 
thought that there were ‘great technical, operational and logistic advantages’ to the Trident 
C4 as it was ‘a system in service with the US Navy’.19 
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 Duff and Mason were relatively optimistic that the US would agree to assist the UK’s 
efforts to replace Polaris. In November 1977, Carter had assured the British of the United 
States’ ‘continuing self-interest… in the maintenance of the United Kingdom’s independent 
nuclear capacity’.20 Carter made this assurance alongside his ambitious vision to pursue 
significant reductions in Soviet and US nuclear capability and nuclear non-proliferation.21  
In order to understand this seemingly contradictory position, it is necessary to think 
of the UK’s nuclear programme within the wider framework of US non-proliferation and 
Cold War strategy. Through the provision of a replacement American missile system, the 
UK’s nuclear programme remained technically dependent upon the US, providing the US 
with a degree of control over Britain’s nuclear policy. 22  Without US support, the UK 
government would likely pursue an independent delivery system. This would reduce the 
UK’s conventional defence expenditure and thereby undermine Western efforts to counter 
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the UK’s nuclear capability reinforced the credibility of the 
US nuclear umbrella to Europe through the commitment of Britain’s nuclear force to NATO 
and by providing a second centre of decision-making. This, in turn, stemmed further 
proliferation. 23  As such, Duff and Mason foresaw that continued US-UK nuclear 
cooperation ‘would involve least risk to the US commitment to the defence of Europe’.24 
This was a key point of consideration for the Carter administration. Since the President’s 
election, the White House had struggled to ameliorate doubts in the US nuclear umbrella 
amongst Western governments. These increased doubts were due to uneasiness about US-
USSR strategic parity at the international level, alongside Soviet deployment of the SS-20. 
This medium-range missile was not included within the SALT framework, but its 
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deployment arguably shifted the military balance in Europe towards the USSR.25 
 Duff and Mason were also optimistic about the supply of Trident C4 due to US 
efforts to abate British concerns over possible restrictions in the SALT II treaty. Throughout 
the SALT II process, the Soviets had argued that the US could circumvent the qualitative 
restrictions in the treaty by secretly transferring forbidden weapons systems or military 
technologies to its NATO allies. In order to alleviate these concerns, the final treaty 
included a non-circumvention clause, whereby the US and USSR agreed not to circumvent 
the provisions of the agreement ‘through any other state’.26 However, this, in turn, had 
raised the concerns of the United States’ allies in Europe that the Soviets could use the non-
circumvention clause to argue that US defence cooperation with its NATO allies broke the 
spirit of the agreement.27 In particular, British officials were concerned about the impact 
of any non-circumvention clause on their efforts to replace Polaris.28 In 1977, John Hunt 
foresaw that any non-circumvention provision was ‘liable to give the Russians a peg on 
which they can hang claims, however unjustified, that the agreement is being infringed’.29 
To maintain alliance support for SALT, and clarify the meaning of the non-circumvention 
treaty publicly, in March 1978 the White House decided that they would release an 
interpretive statement on the consequences of a non-circumvention clause for US 
cooperation with allies, at the same time as the signing of SALT II.30 Duff and Mason felt 
that these actions resolved many of Britain’s fears about the non-circumvention clause. 
Indeed, they noted that Harold Brown, US Secretary of Defense, had explicitly stated in a 
Senate ratification meeting that ‘the US was allowed under the interpretive statement to 
provide the Allies with modernised forces along the lines of the Cruise Missile and Trident 
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submarines’.31 
 Nevertheless, Duff and Mason warned that, even without specific restrictions, the 
SALT process could influence Britain’s efforts to replace Polaris due to the need for the US 
to consider ‘the political implications for SALT’.32 The supply of a MIRV system could be 
one such area for political consideration. Concerns that the US would not provide the 
MIRVed Poseidon system had partly motivated British development of Chevaline. The 
Nixon administration feared that the provision of such a system, which would have vastly 
improved Britain’s first strike capability, could undermine SALT I negotiations and thereby 
encounter congressional dissent.33 The provision of MIRV was now even more politically 
salient in the SALT process. 
The key provision of the final SALT II agreement was an aggregate ceiling for 
strategic launchers of 2,250 for each side. This included a 1,320 MIRV sub-limit consisting 
of no more than 820 MIRVed inter-continental ballistic missile systems and 120 strategic 
bombers equipped with cruise missiles. During negotiations, the Soviets argued that the 
national nuclear forces of Britain and France, as well as forward-based nuclear forces in 
Western Europe, tilted the strategic balance towards the West.34 Therefore, the Soviets 
wanted British and French systems included in the agreed limits as well as a non-transfer 
clause. Washington rejected these demands as they believed that pitting Soviet nuclear 
forces against all Western allied forces would undercut the US ‘deterrent’ and raise allied 
doubts in the nuclear umbrella. The NATO alliance strongly supported the United States 
long-standing rejection of Soviet pressure to include non-central systems.35 In negotiations 
for SALT III, Duff and Mason expected the US to continue to resist Soviet pressure for the 
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inclusion of British and French systems. However, in the declaration of principles for SALT 
III, the US and the Soviet Union had committed to ‘seeking… significant and substantial 
reductions in strategic system numbers’.36 The supply of a MIRV system would provide the 
British with a sharp increase in capability and thus could intensify feelings in Moscow that 
UK and French systems should be included in SALT III and could consequently stem 
progress. As such, given the political salience of MIRV and British systems within SALT, 
Duff and Mason thought it ‘difficult to judge whether the US would offer their MIRV 
capability’.37  
 If the US refused to sell Britain a MIRV system, this would create difficulties for the 
replacement of Polaris. The MIRV capability was integral to the design of the Trident C4. 
The removal of this capability ‘would entail a major re-design and re-testing programme, 
leading to a missile degraded in performance and unique to Britain’.38 Such a redesign 
would increase the missile costs by ‘at least double those of Trident’.39 Duff and Mason 
concluded that there would need to be further exploration of Britain’s inferior alternatives 
if the Carter administration refused to supply Trident C4 with MIRV.40 The report clarified 
that inquiries to Carter over his willingness to provide Trident C4 with MIRV was essential 
to progress on Polaris replacement. Subsequently, when a Cabinet committee discussed 
the report on 21 December 1978, Callaghan decided that he would utilise the upcoming 
Guadeloupe summit to inquire about the President’s attitude vis-à-vis the supply of 
Trident.41 
On 5-6 January 1979, Jimmy Carter, James Callaghan, Helmut Schmidt, the German 
Chancellor, and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the French President, met for confidential, 
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informal deliberations on Western security issues.42 At the summit, Callaghan took the 
opportunity to have a private discussion with Carter about the President’s attitude to US 
assistance with the replacement of Polaris. Carter responded positively to Callaghan’s 
inquiries, replying to the Prime Minister that he wished for Britain to remain a nuclear 
power and that he could see ‘no objection’ to the supply of Trident C4 with MIRV.43 
Carter’s forthcoming attitude to the provision of a MIRV system delighted and 
surprised UK officials. 44  Given the previous uncertainty about the White House’s 
willingness to provide MIRV, British officials wanted the conversation on-the-record. 
Subsequently, in late March, Callaghan sent a letter to Carter recapping their conversation 
in Guadeloupe, and Carter’s assurances that he would be ‘willing in principle to consider 
the possibility’ of making the Trident C4 MIRVed missile available to the British. 45 
However, Carter, in his reply, took a cautionary approach. Carter assured Callaghan of his 
willingness ‘to talk to your people as suggested’ but he made no mention of Trident C4, and 
stressed that there should be no presumption about the outcome of the negotiations.46 
The White House felt it necessary, in drafting this reply, for Carter to take a positive, yet 
non-committal, stance to Polaris replacement. Despite President Carter’s broad support for 
US assistance with the replacement of Polaris, any Trident agreement was still contingent 
on further negotiations.  
 
Despite Carter’s forthcoming attitude at Guadeloupe, over the course of 1979, the White 
House procrastinated over the supply of Trident due to the political difficulties it raised for 
the dual-track decision and the SALT process. Following Margaret Thatcher’s victory over 
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James Callaghan in the 1979 general election, the US and UK governments arranged 
preliminary talks on the replacement of Polaris to take place in August 1979.47 In these 
discussions, US officials expressed support for Polaris replacement. However, alongside 
this, David Aaron, US Deputy National Security Advisor, emphasised that the 
administration had made no decision yet on whether they would be willing to transfer 
MIRV.48 Such a ‘major step’ required ‘careful thought’.49 Aaron’s caution is in marked 
contrast to the apparent assurances Carter gave Callaghan at Guadeloupe. 
The administration had now considered the potential political problems the supply 
of MIRV could cause. According to current archival declassifications, the White House had 
not given in-depth consideration to Britain’s replacement of Polaris before Guadeloupe and 
indeed did not expect Callaghan to raise the issue at the summit.50 As such following 
Thatcher’s request for the August preliminary talks, Zbigniew Brzezinski, US National 
Security Advisor, asked the Pentagon to produce two reports, one on US-UK nuclear 
cooperation and the second on the relationship between the UK’s replacement options and 
wider issues including Theatre Nuclear Force (TNF) modernisation and the SALT process.51 
Given Aaron’s comments, this in-depth consideration had clearly made it apparent that the 
provision of a MIRV system could provoke a Soviet reaction that might undermine Senate 
support to ratify the SALT II treaty and hamper Carter’s hopes for deep cuts in SALT III.  
 On 18 June 1979, Carter and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Union, 
met to sign the SALT II accord. In the summer of 1979, despite vociferous criticism from 
several quarters, it appeared that the Senate would ratify the treaty.52 However, the White 
House would face an uphill battle in maintaining this narrow majority, due to declining 
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support for the SALT process, rising tensions in Soviet-American relations, and an 
increasing mistrust of Moscow. Indeed, such was the domestic environment, any perceived 
aggression from the Soviet Union had the potential to terminate Senate ratification.53 The 
provision of a MIRV system to the British could provoke such a Soviet reaction. The Soviets 
would likely publicly argue, despite the interpretive statement, that the supply of a MIRV 
system went against the spirit of the non-circumvention clause. Consequently, there was 
the possibility that the Soviets could react in a way that would heighten feelings of Senate 
mistrust of Moscow, thus undermining support to ratify the SALT II treaty. The supply 
could also bolster Soviet arguments that British systems should be included in SALT III due 
to their increased capability. Concurrently British officials believed that US reservations on 
the supply of MIRV arose from the ‘possible impact of a sharp increase in UK strategic 
warhead numbers upon the Soviet attitude, especially on deep cuts within SALT III’.54  
Events at Guadeloupe had further complicated the supply of a MIRV system. Carter’s 
top priority at the summit was to resolve European concerns over nuclear parity, and Soviet 
development of SS-20s.55 At Guadeloupe, Carter, Callaghan, Schmidt and Giscard reached 
agreement on a dual-track solution: NATO would deploy Ground Launch Cruise Missiles 
and Pershing IIs in Europe, and Washington would propose to open arms control 
negotiations with Moscow.56 The dual-track decision provided implicit justification for US 
provision of the Trident C4 system. Political reasons, rather than military, motivated US 
support for Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Force (LRTNF) deployments in Europe.57 The 
White House hoped that LRTNF modernisation would restore Western confidence in US 
leadership of the alliance, following the neutron bomb fiasco, and would shore up 
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confidence in the viability of NATO’s spectrum of deterrence.58 These political motivations 
for LRTNF deployment concurrently provided a rationale for the replacement of Polaris. 
Within this political thinking, it would have been difficult for the US to refuse Britain a 
nuclear weapons system that they would, in turn, commit to NATO.  
On the other hand, the dual-track decision alongside Polaris replacement could be 
detrimental to US-Soviet relations. Discussion of LRTNF deployment placed further strain 
on Superpower relations. Indeed, evidence from the Soviet archives suggests that the dual-
track decision was the ‘last drop tipping the scales’ prompting Brezhnev to approve the 
invasion of Afghanistan.59 A decision to deploy LRTNF could heighten Soviet sensitivities 
about the British and French systems. Following US rebuttal of Soviet demands for the 
inclusion of British and French systems, as well as US LRTNF, in the SALT process, the 
Soviets arguably saw the SS-20 as a counterbalance to these systems. 60  NATO 
modernisation of LRTNF would obviously concern the Soviets. However, given the context, 
and the following rationale for developing SS-20s, any talk of replacing Polaris alongside 
LRTNF modernisation had the potential to cause serious disagreement.  
Despite this uncertain political environment, the Thatcher government’s concerns 
over US attitudes on the supply of MIRV were soon negated. On 28 September, US 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told UK Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington that, ‘he 
would recommend very strongly to the President that the Americans should make available 
to the UK the Trident C4 system, including the associated MIRVed technology’.61 This firm 
support from Vance was particularly helpful to the UK government as, following the August 
preliminary talks, they had determined it to be politically judicious to secure a swift 
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agreement on the supply of Trident by the end of December before the White House 
‘became too pre-occupied’ with the 1980 election.62 
Unfortunately for the British, as their concerns about US willingness to supply 
Trident C4 with MIRV again abated, Carter’s political situation became more problematic. 
At the end of August, US intelligence agencies ‘discovered’ a Soviet ground force brigade in 
Cuba. In fact, there had been a small Soviet training unit stationed on the island since well 
before the 1962 missile crisis. However, due to a combination of bureaucratic inefficiency 
and sensitivity on the political right, the ‘discovery’ created a domestic furore.63 The belief 
that the Soviets had introduced new military units into Cuba fuelled pre-existing doubts 
that Moscow could not be trusted and further damaged the prospects of SALT ratification.64 
In addition, as Vance later reflected, the ‘political storm’ delayed Senate consideration of 
the treaty ‘long enough for it to be overtaken and shelved as a result of the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan’.65   
The controversy also negatively influenced Moscow’s view of Carter. The US 
President’s objection to a small, longstanding, and non-threatening military brigade in an 
allied country perplexed the Soviet leadership. Further disenchanted and distrustful of 
Washington, the incident raised Soviet suspicions about the desire, and ability, of the 
Carter administration to resume détente.66 This consequently increased the risk that the 
Soviets would act in a way Senators would perceive as mistrustful, and hence endanger 
SALT ratification. 
At the same time, the dual-track decision became more problematic politically for 
the White House. In October, Moscow began a concerted campaign against NATO TNF 
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deployments with Brezhnev proposing to discuss arms control of LRTNF, conditioned on 
NATO reneging on the deployment of new missiles. Concurrently, Soviet officials 
increasingly argued that their LRTNF were a counter-balance to British and French 
systems.67  
The US feared that this propaganda could undermine efforts to achieve alliance 
consensus on the dual-track approach by December. Trying to gain this consensus had 
been a difficult task for NATO officials over the course of 1979. The Danish, Dutch, Belgian 
and Norwegian governments had been deeply hesitant about their states' participation in 
future deployments of LRTNF and subsequently advocated an arms control solution.68 In 
addition, these NATO Governments, alongside Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
were reluctant to support a decision that was likely to be extremely unpopular with large 
sections of their electorate.69 Many NATO governments were subsequently concerned that 
‘significant political forces in Western Europe’ might be responsive to Moscow’s suggestion 
for arms control talks without agreement among NATO to modernise LRTNF.70 In turn, 
this created concern of an intensification of public debate in the Netherlands, which could 
then spill over into West Germany, Belgium, and Italy and undermine the fragile consensus 
that was forming.71    
At this delicate time, any public talk of Polaris replacement could further upset the 
Soviets and heighten many NATO members’ concerns about domestic reaction to dual-
track. Distinctions between strategic and tactical weapons, and the need to modernise both 
could easily appear academic and nonsensical in public debates. As such, talk of replacing 
Polaris in addition to LRTNF deployment could stir further public anti-nuclear sentiment.  
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These US concerns over SALT ratification and a NATO decision on dual-track 
subsequently affected White House thinking on Polaris replacement. In October, 
Brzezinski, Brown and Vance recommended that the President inform Thatcher that he 
would respond ‘affirmatively’ to a request for assistance with the replacement of Polaris, 
including any application for the Trident C4 system. However, they concurrently suggested 
that the British be asked to delay any ‘formal request’ for assistance ‘until after an alliance 
decision on TNF and SALT ratification’.72 The three men feared that a Polaris replacement 
deal before the conclusion of these other matters could provide some NATO allies with ‘an 
excuse for not participating in TNF’ and the Soviets with ‘further incentive to scuttle 
SALT’. 73  The President subsequently informed Thatcher that he would respond 
affirmatively to a request for the Trident C4 missile system, but asked for a delay until after 
Alliance agreement on LRTNF deployment in December. 74  White House officials also 
privately affirmed to the British that Carter harboured additional concerns about a transfer 
interfering with Senate ratification of SALT II. 75  These US actions clearly display the 
manner in which SALT, Theatre Nuclear Force modernisation, and Polaris replacement 
were interconnected. Trident was not a priority in this hierarchy. US actions demonstrated 
that while the White House supported the replacement of Polaris, they did not prioritise 
this over intra-alliance relations or arms control efforts.  
As the White House only requested a delay to any formal agreement, the US request 
did not provoke great concern amongst British officials. Indeed, the US commitment to 
provide a MIRVed C4 brought relief to the Thatcher government, and officials continued 
to believe that Thatcher would be able to make a formal request in her scheduled December 
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meeting with Carter, ready for a public announcement in January. Nevertheless, as British 
officials were aware, a timely Trident announcement was now reliant on the TNF decision 
and SALT ratification proceeding as planned.76 
On 4 November 1979, Carter became embroiled in another foreign policy crisis when 
Iranian militants stormed the US embassy in Tehran, taking sixty-six Americans hostage. 
The White House’s attempts to secure the hostages’ release dominated their foreign policy 
agenda until the end of Carter’s term and severely damaged his already eroding domestic 
position.77 By the winter of 1979, Carter’s apparent mishandling of foreign affairs was 
undermining his presidency and threatening re-election hopes. This reinforced Carter’s 
need for a foreign policy success with SALT. Indeed, as David Aaron told the lead British 
negotiator on Polaris replacement, Robert Wade-Gery, ‘It was the “mainspring” of Mr 
Carter’s Presidency; without it the Presidency would “be destroyed”.’78 
 Prospects for SALT ratification were looking increasingly difficult. For the Senate to 
ratify the treaty, most observers believed there would need to be further amendments, 
which the Soviets would probably dislike.79 This created issues for the UK’s efforts to 
replace Polaris. The White House feared that at the same time they announced the sale of 
a Polaris replacement: ‘the Russians might well attach a counter-rider insisting that the 
British deal be abandoned. The President could not survive if SALT II was lost because (as 
it seemed) he had made the wrong deal… at the wrong moment’.80 Subsequently, at the 
end of November, Aaron informed Wade-Gery that, due to continued difficulties with SALT 
II, the White House now wished to delay final agreement on the sale of Trident until after 
the treaty’s ratification.81  
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 Aaron’s strong words provoked concern amongst British officials. The White 
House’s wish to postpone an announcement ‘to an unsettled date possibly some months in 
the future’, despite NATO’s December agreement on dual-track, would create serious 
problems for the Thatcher Government. 82  Thatcher’s Cabinet Secretary, Robert 
Armstrong, decried the US position as ‘disappointing and unsatisfactory’. He informed  
Thatcher that, ‘we want to get the President firmly and formally committed sooner rather 
than later; the longer we leave it, the closer we get to the United States election, and the 
greater is likely to become his reluctance to commit himself.’83 As such, despite the small 
chance of success, British officials determined that in her upcoming meeting with Carter 
on 17 December, Thatcher needed to persuade the President to finalise the Trident 
agreement within ‘weeks rather than months’.84 
 Thatcher’s efforts at persuasion were unsuccessful. President Carter held firm; any 
formal request for Trident would have to wait until after the ratification of SALT II.85 
However, in a glimmer of hope for the British, Carter said that, if Congress failed to ratify 
SALT II, ‘There would then be no obstacle to his agreeing to a request from the United 
Kingdom Government to a successor to Polaris’.86 The meeting confirmed to the British 
that SALT had halted their efforts to secure a Polaris replacement. It was clear that until 
Carter had his prized treaty ratified or reason to give up on the process entirely, there would 
be no Trident agreement.  
 On 24 December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The invasion ended 
any remaining illusion of détente; the US perceived the attack as a determined attempt to 
gain access to the Persian Gulf and encircle Western oil supplies. Given Carter’s domestic 
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standing, the President needed to show strength in the face of Soviet aggression.87 As part 
of this, Carter requested the Senate delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty.88 
 These events raised British hopes of securing formal agreement on the sale of 
Trident. The environment certainly seemed more conducive to the supply of Trident. The 
invasion led to a further hardening of Carter’s foreign policy. With the President refocusing 
on containment of the USSR, he largely abandoned what was left of his human rights and 
nuclear non-proliferation policies.89 With this downturn in US-Soviet relations, the Carter 
administration was less concerned about the impact of a Trident deal on future arms 
control negotiations, such as SALT III.90 Furthermore, over the winter of 1979-80, Carter 
pushed for increased defence spending to modernise US nuclear and conventional forces.91 
British acquisition of Trident would be a key contribution to this. In this way, the invasion 
of Afghanistan resulted in the eradication of some of the contradictions between Carter’s 
arms control policies and the sale of Trident, as well as strengthened US reasoning for the 
deal.  
 Nevertheless, in early 1980, despite the indefinite delay of SALT ratification, the 
White House continued to procrastinate on finalising the sale of Trident. In the aftermath 
of the invasion, the political problems of Carter increased, and in this environment, the 
administration was concerned about any potential criticism from the sale of Trident C4. 
Domestically, Carter was struggling to secure the Democratic nomination for the 
Presidency and, even if he did so, the Republican front-runner, Ronald Reagan, was ahead 
of Carter in the opinion polls.92 Internationally, Carter’s response to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan was widely criticised as an overreaction.93  
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 Subsequently, in early February, David Aaron informed Wade-Gery that Carter was 
still committed to the supply of Trident and no longer saw a connection between the timing 
of the British request and SALT ratification. However, the President still wished to delay 
final agreement on the Trident sale as, ‘The Administration were [sic] already being 
accused, domestically and internationally, of over-reacting to the crisis. If they now 
announced a decision to help us over Polaris replacement, that would be seen as a further 
and extreme example of over-reaction. It might also be divisive of the Alliance, which was 
quite badly enough divided as it was.’94 
Due to their concerns over the further delay, over the following month, the British 
endeavoured to secure a commitment from the US to finalise the sale of Trident.95 On 17 
March 1980, the White House finally decided that the agreement should be concluded. This 
decision came even though Brzezinski argued that it ‘would be preferable to delay until 
1981’ as the Soviet reaction to the British decision ‘could create political complications’ for 
Carter in the run-up to the election.96 In response, Vance and Brown argued that, ‘The 
British could not count on a 1981 commitment and… even asking the British to wait would 
create serious concerns in Britain about our commitment, leading to leaks that would be 
harmful politically and could endanger SALT.’97 Fortunately for the Thatcher government, 
the President subsequently agreed with Vance and Brown. Finally, the Carter 
administration had decided to move ahead with the Trident deal. 98  Ironically, the 
argument that swayed the White House was the harm that the British reaction could do 
politically to the administration and SALT with further delay.  
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Jimmy Carter’s Trident tribulations were finally over. However, this was not due to 
the resolution of Carter’s complex dilemmas around the supply of Trident, including his 
moral quandary on the provision.99 Instead, the President’s priorities evolved and laid the 
foundation for Reagan’s more aggressive approach. Consequently, the Carter 
administration now sought to utilise the negotiations over the terms of sale to aid US efforts 
in the renewed Cold War. In exchange for a reduction in the price of Trident C4, the Carter 
administration sought British commitments on conventional forces and permission to 
expand the US military base on the UK-controlled island of Diego Garcia. This base was of 
increased strategic importance to the White House in the aftermath of the invasion of 
Afghanistan due to the resultant acceleration of plans to enhance US military capability in 
the Persian Gulf.100 Therefore, through the supply of Trident, the Carter administration 
was able to bolster NATO, in a relatively cheap way, by ensuring the maintenance of 
Britain’s conventional and nuclear forces, and concurrently aid US efforts in the renewed 
Cold War. In this way, the Carter White House utilised the sale of Trident to reinforce the 
existing Cold War security architecture and the nuclear order that they had once been 
determined to modify through arms control.  
 
In November 1980, Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in the US Presidential election 
on a platform of strategic modernisation. Subsequently, in 1981, Reagan decided that the 
US would replace the Trident C4 missile with the more advanced Trident D5 by 1989.101 At 
the same time, President Reagan offered the British the option to purchase the D5 instead 
of the C4, to maintain commonality with the US.102 Reagan’s forthcoming offer was a stark 
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contrast to Carter’s procrastination on the supply of a MIRV system, particularly given the 
D5’s advanced capability. The Trident D5 was ‘not just a modernised C4’ but ‘a completely 
new missile’. 103  Alongside the MX missile, the D5 was at the forefront of US inter-
continental ballistic missile technology. It could be MIRVed to fourteen re-entry vehicles 
per missile; the limit permitted by the provisions negotiated in SALT II.104  
Yet the decisiveness of Ronald Reagan was not due to his belief in the US-UK nuclear 
relationship per se. The contrast between Reagan’s quick decision and the vacillation of 
Carter is unsurprising given the Republican’s initial approach to the Cold War. Throughout 
1981-83, the Reagan administration adopted a highly confrontational policy towards the 
Soviet Union.105 In order to ‘blunt and contain Soviet imperialism’, Reagan believed that 
the United States needed to engage in military, political and economic competition with 
the USSR. 106 Within this aggressive approach, arms control was a low priority for the 
Reagan White House, and they were unconcerned about the impact of a British D5 on US-
USSR relations. 
The events of Reykjavik five years later corroborate that the absence of concern from 
Reagan over the effect of a D5 sale on US-Soviet relations was due to conceptions of how 
to ‘win’ the Cold War rather than support for Britain’s nuclear programme per se. In 1986, 
Reagan nearly reached an agreement with Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of 
the Soviet Union, to dismantle all strategic nuclear weapons.107 This angered Thatcher due 
to its potential impact on Britain’s nuclear force. Indeed, Michael Jopling, a Cabinet 
minister who was with her when she was briefed about the summit, ‘never saw her more 
incandescent’.108 The elimination of all US strategic nuclear systems would ‘have effectively 
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killed off the Trident missile’ forcing Britain to acquire a non-US system to keep their 
nuclear programme.109  
 
From 1977-82, the evolution of US thinking on détente and arms control influenced the 
UK’s efforts to replace its Polaris nuclear system. Throughout the SALT process, the Carter 
White House maintained that strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union 
would not prevent nuclear cooperation with the UK government.110 Relatedly, the precise 
terms of SALT II did not hinder US-UK nuclear cooperation; this was in part due to the US 
responding to the concern of its NATO allies, including the UK. Indeed, in a distinct change 
from the Skybolt crisis and the resultant Polaris sale, there were not powerful elements in 
the US government reluctant to supply an independent nuclear system to the British.111 The 
administration’s attitude towards the US-UK nuclear relationship was one of support or at 
least acquiescence; the British could have the system they wanted if it did not interfere with 
the main policy priorities of the Carter White House. It was the political ramifications of 
supplying Trident C4, particularly due to its MIRV capability, that complicated the UK’s 
efforts to replace Polaris. Whilst the Carter administration expressed support for the 
continuation of the US-UK nuclear relationship, they vacillated on finalising the terms of 
the supply of Trident C4 due to their concurrent concerns about the impact of such a sale 
on NATO cohesion, the SALT process and therefore Carter’s political position.  
Carter’s complex supportive but hesitant attitude towards Trident came from the 
myriad of challenges that he faced, his lack of coherent strategy in the evolving 
international environment of the ‘long 1970s’, as well as the contradictions that existed 
 25 
between the different priorities in US foreign policy.112 Carter hesitated in part due to the 
problems that he faced in tackling the issue of strategic parity at a European and 
international level. With regards to NATO, the supply of Trident ensured the continuation 
of a second-centre of decision-making on nuclear use, which was helpful in stemming 
Western European fears over US de-coupling from Europe due to strategic parity. However, 
the Carter administration also worried that the supply of Trident C4 could damage its arms 
control efforts at the international level. Concurrently the supply of Trident created 
dilemmas for Carter’s non-proliferation aims. On the one hand, the supply of Trident aided 
efforts to create a managed nuclear order – through the maintenance of a degree of US 
control and strengthening the US nuclear umbrella in Europe. Yet it also was contentious 
for East-West diplomacy, and the supply of an advanced system raised moral dilemmas for 
Carter. 
This hesitation on Trident is another example of Jimmy Carter’s tendency to 
vacillate in his foreign policy. 113  In this case, Carter’s vacillation created significant 
uncertainty for the UK government as they sought to secure agreement on the sale of the 
Trident C4 system. Yet, the negative ramifications that the Carter White House feared from 
the supply of Trident mostly dissipated in 1980, due to events external to US-UK nuclear 
cooperation. This enabled the British to secure a formal agreement on the sale of Trident 
before Carter became distracted with his re-election campaign; the timing of the Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan was fortuitous for the British nuclear programme. 
In contrast, the Reagan administration’s offer to sell the Trident D5 system was swift 
– primarily due to Reagan’s differing priorities in the Cold War. At this point in his 
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Presidency, Reagan did not face the same dilemmas as Carter over the supply of Trident 
due to his belief that strengthening nuclear and conventional forces, not arms control, was 
the solution to strategic parity. It will be interesting to see, with further exploration of the 
archival material, the ways in which Reagan’s shift in policy towards arms control after 1983 
influenced the US-UK nuclear relationship.  
Following the dissipation of Carter’s dilemmas over the supply of Trident, the 
eventual sale of the Trident system reinforced the US-UK nuclear relationship as an 
accepted part of the global nuclear order, something that still mostly holds today. As such, 
unlike many other developments in the ‘long 1970s’, the Trident agreements reinforced the 
US-led Cold War security architecture. The sale of Trident missiles ensured, via the 
continuation of the US-UK nuclear relationship, that Britain would remain a significant 
nuclear power. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations also utilised the agreement to 
strengthen NATO’s nuclear and conventional strength. Yet, as this article has 
demonstrated, this outcome was not inevitable. The Thatcher government certainly felt a 
large amount of contingency in the discussions. 
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